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majority of the court was trying in the instant case to avoid its
use, being unwilling to take the first step toward the adoption of
this doctrine. Although the Supreme Court of Appeals in this
case would be giving a much more equitable solution by adopting
this theory and not holding Craig liable for the results of Sim-
mons' negligent act of not turning on the lights of his vehicle
at a time when they were clearly needed, it could have accom-
plished the same result by merely refusing to interfere with the
jury's findings at the trial. It is thus apparent that the Supreme
Court is advising lower courts not to allow juries to compare
negligence in reaching their verdicts for fear of reversal on ap-
peal. As a result, Virginia appears to be, at the present time, on
the basis of the decision of the instant case, unalterably opposed to
any introduction of the doctrine of comparable negligence either
directly through court acquiescence in its principles or indirectly




The Court of Appeals of Kentucky was faced with what
they termed to be a $64,000.00 question. Is it lawful for a man
to adopt his wife as his child and heir at law?1
Testatrix executed a will, which set up a trust for the life
of her son. At the son's death, the trust was "to be distributed
to the heirs at law of my said son according to the law of Descent
and Distribution" in force in Kentucky at son's death. In 1941,
18 years after testatrix's death, son adopted his wife "as his legal
heir at law and child." The Kentucky Court of Appeals held it
to be lawful to adopt a wife as a child and heir at law in entering
judgment in favor of the wife.
The largest obstacle placed in the court's, path was that the
adoption was void as against public policy. Contestants argued
that this adoption would vitiate common law unity of husband
and wife. The majority of the court held that even though
IBendinger et al. v. Graybill's Executor & Trustees et al., - Ky. -, 302
S.W.2d 594 (1957).
married, there remained two distinct personalities. The Ken-
tucky statute states that the adopted person will be considered
for inheritance and succession purposes as the natural and legiti-
mate child. The relationship could not be incestuous because
these types of statutes have been construed to mean of the same
blood line in specified degrees. In interpreting statutory legal
problems, public policy and attitudes are inherent barriers that
the court must ponder before passing on them. This insures that
no exceptions will be created. The court realized this for they
said in the instant case that the public policy argument might be
invoked in a case of marriage between the parties after adoption.
Their main concern here was one solely of statutory adoption.
To make one an heir by adoption is a sanctioned device.2
This is so even if the adopted person is an adult and married to
another. This gives added protection to the one adopted, when
taking under the provisions of a will. It takes away any induce-
ment of those who would otherwise have been his heirs to oppose
the will. As adoption was unknown at common law, the right
of inheritance by adoption is conferred by statute.3 Where this
right is not conferred, the statutory construction argument of
strict construction applies.
The dissent took the position that the old statute and its con-
struction should be applicable. This in effect meant the adopted
person took from the adoptive parent and not through them.
In net effect this would keep the property in the blood line.
Major v. Kramer4 interpreted the new statute to mean that the
adopted person could inherit from or fhrough5 the adoptive par-
ent unless intention to the contrary appear in the will. So the
argument propounded by the contestant of shifting the property
from the blood line of testatrix is of no avail.
In view of the anomolous problem presented, the decision
2 Green v. Fitzpatrick, 220 Ky. 590, 295 S.W. 896 (1927). Contra: where
adults may not be adopted, First National Bank v. Mott, 101 Fla. 1224,
133 Co. 78 (1931). The different results reached in these cases are
based on the construction of the particular statute; some specifically
state children and adults while others refer only to children.
3 Kentucky Revised Statutes, 199.530 (1953).
4 258 S.W.2d 506 (1953).
On this general problem of the right of adopted child or person to inherit
from kindred of adoptive parent, see 43 A.L.R.2d 1183.
reaches its logical conclusion. Statutory adoption is tending to-
ward a more liberal policy. The major area of conflict revolves
around whether the legislature only sanctions inheritance from
the adoptive parent or will allow the more liberal through inter-
pretation. Thus the boundary line is drawn. Since a person is
allowed to adopt another for purposes of inheritance, it seems no
stretch of legal imagination to sanction this particular one. Once
the separability of Husband and Wife are recognized there is no
problem. Common law barriers are elastic and not static.
F. P. B.
